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GUARDING THE GOLDEN YEARS:  
HOW PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP FOR 
ELDERS CAN HELP STATES MEET  
THE MANDATES OF OLMSTEAD 
Abstract: The aging American population will quickly lead to a greater demand 
for long-term care and services for people who are unable to care for themselves. 
Some older adults may require other individuals to make informed decisions on 
their behalf. State guardianship programs must confront the tension of providing 
protections for people who are incapacitated while respecting their autonomy, 
particularly when making decisions involving a person’s residence. When elderly 
adults wish to stay in their communities and are capable of doing so, a lack of 
proper support may be a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(“ADA”), as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1999 in Olmstead v. L.C. 
ex rel. Zimring. One solution may be found in effective public guardianship pro-
grams. This Note explores the effect of Olmstead on state funding for long-term 
care, the implications of the Olmstead decision for guardianship, and common 
models of public guardianship. This Note then argues that existing public guardi-
anship programs, if appropriately funded and held to proper standards, can help 
states meet the mandates of the ADA and Olmstead. 
INTRODUCTION 
The American population is aging rapidly, with significant implications 
for policy makers and society.1 With seventy-five million baby boomers born 
between 1946 and 1964, approximately one in five Americans is expected to 
be over sixty-five by the year 2050.2 With improvements in medical technolo-
gies leading to longer life expectancies, baby boomers are expected to live 
longer after being diagnosed with a debilitating illness.3 In addition, the rise in 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush 
Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157, 1177 (2004) (noting the imminent retirement age 
of baby boomers); Jon Pynoos et al., Aging in Place, Housing, and the Law, 16 ELDER L.J. 77, 79 
(2008) (noting that baby boomers will have needs different from previous populations and will have 
impacts on their communities); LORAINE A. WEST ET AL., 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 5 (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2014), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/
2014/demo/p23-212.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S63C-TKB9 (reporting that the population of 
Americans aged 65 and older continually grows more rapidly than the population under 65). 
 2 See West et al., supra note 1, at 5. This percentage increased from 4.1% in 1900 to 13% in 
2010. Id. 
 3 See A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship: A Little Hope for the Future, 
2012 UTAH L. REV. 1541, 1546 (discussing forecasted increases in the aging and developmental disa-
bilities populations, along with how families are more geographically spread out and are therefore less 
1218 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1217 
the older adult population will result in more people becoming incapacitated 
by mental illness, including dementia.4 Consequently, aging adults who are 
unable to care for themselves will have a greater need for long-term care and 
services.5 As people live longer with potentially incapacitating conditions, 
some older adults will require others to make informed decisions on their be-
half.6 
Given the aging population, guardianship programs for elders in the Unit-
ed States must confront this issue.7 Guardians and caregivers have long experi-
enced the tension of protecting individuals who are incapacitated, primarily 
elders and people with disabilities, while respecting their autonomy.8 The de-
sire to protect these populations historically led to their placement in nursing 
homes and other institutions.9 Policy makers have begun to reallocate funds to 
                                                                                                                           
likely to serve as guardians); Pamela B. Teaster et al., Wards of the State: A National Study of Public 
Guardianship, 37 STETSON L. REV. 193, 195 (2007) (noting the “graying” of the population coincid-
ing with advances in medical technology). In addition to improvements in modern medicine, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health and other scientific institutions fund research projects to extend life expec-
tancies. JAMES H. SCHULZ & ROBERT H. BINSTOCK, AGING NATION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 
OF GROWING OLDER IN AMERICA 184 (2006). 
 4 Alzheimer’s Association, 2014 Alzheimer’s Disease: Facts and Figures, 21 (2014), available at 
http://www.alz.org/downloads/facts_figures_2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SFV8-4BU6 (stat-
ing that baby boomers have “begun to reach the age range of elevated risk for Alzheimer’s”). 
 5 Marshall B. Kapp, Where Will I Live? How Do Housing Choices Get Made for Older Persons?, 
15 NAELA Q. 2, 3 (2002) (stating that someone else might have to make decisions on behalf of care 
recipients who require long-term care to remain at home but lack the capacity to be autonomous con-
sumers); see Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 86. 
 6 See Naomi Karp et al., Choosing Home for Someone Else: Guardian Residential Decision-
Making, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1445, 1445; Linda S. Whitton, Caring for the Incapacitated—A Case for 
Nonprofit Surrogate Decision Makers in the Twenty-First Century, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 879, 879 
(1996) (discussing demographic patterns that would lead to “a rising need for surrogates to make 
personal and financial decisions for those who have lost the capacity to manage their own affairs”). 
 7 See Winsor C. Schmidt et al., Development and Trends in the Status of Public Guardianship: 
Highlights of the 2007 National Public Guardianship Study, 33 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. 
REP. 728, 728 (2009) (describing trends that led to the need for a second national study of public 
guardianship, including the aging of the population, extended lifespans, and mobility of families). 
 8 See Johns, supra note 3, at 1544 (noting that guardianship statutes have been a part of states’ 
jurisprudence “since their statehood, or territorial organization”); Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for 
Persons with Mental Illness—A Legal and Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 279, 279 (2011) (stating that guardianship implications pits the individual’s right of autonomy 
against the state’s interest in protecting people from harm). 
 9 See Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 85. In addition to nursing homes, people with developmental 
disabilities and mental illness were frequently confined in state-run institutions. See Sylvia B. Caley & 
Steven D. Caley, The Olmstead Decision: The Road to Dignity and Freedom, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
651, 653 (2010); Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is Good, You’ll Find Out 
When You Reach the Top, You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and 
Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More Than “Idiot Wind”?, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 253 (2002). 
These institutions often were the subject of case law regarding the mistreatment of individuals with 
disabilities. Perlin, supra at 252–53 (summarizing cases on the issue, including Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 
F.2d 1305, 1311 (5th Cir. 1974), where the Fifth Circuit recalled how several patients had died as a 
result of physical abuse and neglect suffered in institutions). 
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allow people to remain in the community for as long as possible.10 Moreover, 
research shows that the practice of encouraging home and community based 
options aligns with people’s preferences.11 All too often, however, barriers, 
including lack of funding and proper support, lead to older adults being institu-
tionalized against their will.12 
The tension between protecting people from harm and respecting their 
self-autonomy will affect millions of individuals and families in the decades to 
come.13 Given that some elderly adults who are institutionalized arguably 
could continue to thrive in the community, a lack of proper support for this 
option may be in violation of the ADA, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1999 in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring.14 One solution may be 
found in effective public guardianship programs.15 
This Note explores the issue of guardianship for elders in the United 
States, giving particular attention to the value of and rising need for public 
guardianship.16 Part I gives an overview of the history of guardianship in the 
United States, the ADA, and Olmstead.17 Part II then explores the effect of 
Olmstead on state funding for long-term care, the implications of the Olmstead 
decision for guardianship, and common models of public guardianship.18 Fi-
nally, Part III argues that existing public guardianship programs, if appropriate-
ly funded and held to proper standards, can help states meet the mandates of 
the ADA and Olmstead.19 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See West et al., supra note 1, at 5 (reporting that Medicaid funds have been shifting away from 
nursing homes toward funding for home- and community-based services). 
 11 See Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1470 (summarizing empirical data indicating that the over-
whelming majority of older people want to age in their own homes); AARP, Fixing to Stay: A Nation-
al Survey of Housing and Home Modification Issues, 24 (2000), available at http://assets.aarp.org/
rgcenter/il/home_mod.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X7V2-9KK6 (finding that 80% of people aged 
forty-five and older hoped to stay in their own homes as they aged). 
 12 See Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 87 (explaining that although the ability to choose a home in 
the community is important, there is a lack of affordable and accessible housing in community-based 
settings). Even for elders who do not have guardians, the decision to move to a nursing home or as-
sisted living community may not always be voluntary. See Kapp, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that alt-
hough individuals cannot be involuntary committed to nursing homes, admissions decisions are some-
times made by family members or “voluntarily” by individuals who do not have the capacity to make 
it). 
 13 David Hardy, Who Is Guarding the Guardians? A Localized Call for Improved Guardianship 
Systems and Monitoring, 4 NAELA J. 1, 4 (2008) (stating guardianship implicates “inverse concepts 
of state intervention and personal liberty”); see also KATHLEEN MCINNIS-DITTRICH, SOCIAL WORK 
WITH OLDER ADULTS 76–77 (4th ed. 2014) (discussing the importance and difficulty of providing 
opportunities for older adults while respecting their choices). 
 14 See 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999). 
 15 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 229, 233. 
 16 See infra notes 20–289 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 20–77 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 78–151 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 152–289 and accompanying text. 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ADA, OLMSTEAD, AND PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP 
Guardianship laws affect nearly every aspect of an incapacitated person’s 
life: traveling, finances, medical treatment, the ability to vote, opportunities to 
socialize, and housing and residency.20 Section A of this Part gives a history of 
long-term care and guardianship in the United States.21 Section B provides a 
brief overview of the genesis and rationale behind the ADA.22 Section C then 
examines Olmstead, which articulated the right of Americans with disabilities 
to live in the community as long as it is safe for them to do so.23 
A. History of Public Guardianship Statutes 
America’s guardianship laws date back to at least the feudal English sys-
tem.24 Following the American Revolution, the United States assumed the gen-
eral authority to protect Americans unable to care for themselves.25 This au-
thority likely led to the mass institutionalization of people with disabilities, as 
states used the authority intended to protect people with disabilities to instead 
protect society from people with disabilities.26 The choices, abilities, and con-
tributions to society of people with disabilities was rarely considered or even 
acknowledged.27 
Although there is growing societal acknowledgment of the importance of 
respecting individual choice, guardianship is still widely accepted as a neces-
sary mechanism for the protection of vulnerable adults.28 Even though guardi-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Winsor C. Schmidt, Guardianship for Vulnerable Adults in North Dakota: Recommendations 
Regarding Unmet Needs, Statutory Efficacy, and Cost Effectiveness, 89 N.D. L. REV. 77, 77 (2013) 
(stating that guardians address all aspects of a person’s life); Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardian-
ship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 167 (2010) (giving examples of how 
guardianship laws affect “decisions that define who we are as human beings,” including whether to 
travel, marry, or accept medical treatment). In some states, persons under guardianship are disenfran-
chised. Salzman, supra note 8, at 289. 
 21 See infra notes 24–43 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 44–60 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 61–77 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Hal Fliegelman & Debora C. Fliegelman, Giving Guardians the Power to Do Medicaid 
Planning, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 343–44 (1997). The King acted under the doctrine of 
parens patriae to protect incompetent persons. See Michael D. Casasanto et al., A Model Code of 
Ethics for Guardians, 11 WHITTIER L. REV. 543, 543 (1989); Fliegelman & Fliegelman, supra at 343–
44. 
 25 See Salzman, supra note 20, at 164. 
 26 See id. (discussing the history of some states of adopting eugenics policies and isolating indi-
viduals with mental impairments in institutions); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the history of “unfair and often gro-
tesque mistreatment” of people with disabilities) (citation omitted). 
 27 See Salzman, supra note 20, at 165 (calling society’s treatment of people with disabilities and 
mental illness “checkered, at best”). 
 28 See id. at 166. 
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ans are typically family members, lack of data and research on adult guardian-
ship systems make current numbers and demographics of people under guardi-
anship nearly impossible to determine.29 
Particular challenges arise when individuals become incapable of making 
their own decisions but do not have a close friend or relative who can provide 
informal support or take on the role of legal guardian.30 In these instances, a 
court can appoint a public official or publicly funded organization to serve as 
legal guardian.31 In the 1970s, public guardianship was a fairly new phenome-
non, and practices varied widely.32 Now, public guardianship programs receive 
most or all of their funding from governmental entities, including state appro-
priations and Medicaid funding.33 
Historically, courts used fairly relaxed procedures for the appointment of 
guardians.34 Traditional approaches utilized a medical model, basing a person’s 
need for a guardian primarily on his or her diagnosis.35 When in doubt, courts 
tended to err on the side of appointing a guardian.36 Judges often made deter-
minations of capacity based solely on written information from families or 
agencies.37 In recent decades, Congress and many state legislatures have im-
plemented changes to guardianship statutes.38 Reforms have been aimed large-
ly at the integration of people with disabilities into society and the empower-
ment of people with physical and mental disabilities.39 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Johns, supra note 3, at 1545 (stating that “no good data regarding guardianship practice is 
available”); Sally Hurme & Erica Wood, Third National Guardianship Summit: Standards of Excel-
lent: Introduction, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157, 1162; Brenda K. Uekert & Richard Van Duizend, Adult 
Guardianships: A “Best Guess” National Estimate and the Momentum for Reform, in FUTURE 
TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2011: SPECIAL FOCUS ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE 107, 109 (Carol R. Flango 
et al. eds., 2011). 
 30 See Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 728. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 195. 
 33 See id. at 201 (listing common funding avenues for public guardianship, including county mon-
ies, fees from the ward, or a combination of the above sources). 
 34 Salzman, supra note 20, at 171. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of Limited Guardianship, 31 
STETSON L. REV. 735, 742 (2002) (explaining, through a hypothetical family situation, that plenary 
guardianship is attractive to many judges because it is cost effective, expeditious, and appears to pro-
tect vulnerable people). 
 37 See id. 
 38 Salzman, supra note 20, at 165 n.20 (referencing a number of statutes, including the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796, 791–794 (2006) and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3601–3631, 3604–3605 (2006)). 
 39 Id. Press coverage in the 1980s effected calls for change to guardianship systems in the United 
States. See Elizabeth M. Winchell, If You Want Something Done Right, You’ve Got to Do It Yourself: 
Minnesota Guardians, Group Homes, and the Impermissible Delegation After In re Guardianship of 
Jeffrey Deyoung, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 675, 699 (2012). A 1987 report from the Associated Press 
found that older adults were being “strip[ped] . . . of basic rights” with barely any procedure by judges 
who heard evidence for only a few minutes. See Fred Bayles & Scott McCartney, Guardians of the 
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In particular, state public guardianship laws have undergone substantial 
reform in the past few decades.40 Along with changes to the adjudication of 
incapacity, protection of due process, and eligibility for public guardianship, 
more states have enacted statutes specifically referencing public guardianship 
and providing for public guardianship programs.41 As of a 2005 national public 
guardianship study, forty-one states had statutory provisions for public guardi-
ans.42 Although the other states did not have statutory provisions, most provid-
ed for public guardianship in practice.43 
B. The Genesis of the ADA 
Care for both elders and younger people with developmental disabilities 
and mental illnesses historically took place within institutions.44 Beginning in 
                                                                                                                           
Elderly: An Ailing System, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 20, 1987, available at http://www.apnewsarchive.
com/1987/Guardians-of-the-Elderly-An-Ailing-System-Part-I-Declared-Legally-Dead-by-a-Troubled-
System/id-1198f64bb05d9c1ec690035983c02f9f, archived at http://perma.cc/DKQ9-39M3. The re-
port found that often, mentally or physically disabled elders were failed by the system of guardianship 
that was intended to protect them. See id.; see also Winchell, supra at 697 (stating that historically, 
probate courts considered protection of wards more significant than their rights). 
 40 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 197–98 (listing marked trends in state guardianship laws put 
in place after the Associated Press investigation, including enhanced procedural due process in the 
appointment of a guardian; a shift in focus from medical to functional capacity; more thorough determi-
nation of capacity; an emphasis on limited orders of guardianship tailored to specific needs; more court 
monitoring of guardians; and the development of public guardianship programs); Jennifer L. Wright, 
Protecting Who from What, and Why, and How?: A Proposal for an Integrative Approach to Adult 
Protective Proceedings, 12 ELDER L.J. 53, 58–59 (2004). 
 41 See Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 729. 
 42 Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 205–06. 
 43 Id. (stating that of the nine states (and Washington D.C.) that did not have a statutory program 
for public guardianship, several provided for public guardianship services). Some states might have 
had additional provisions for public guardianship within their statutes for adult protective services, 
which were not researched for the study. Id. n.74. The national guardianship study distinguished be-
tween explicit and implicit public guardianship schemes. Id. at 206; see also Schmidt, supra note 20, 
at 102 (identifying North Dakota’s public guardianship scheme as an “implicit” statutory scheme and 
recommending that North Dakota adopt an explicit scheme, as an increasing number of states have 
done). Of the states that did have public guardianship programs, some of the state statutes provided 
services only for older adults with low assets. Teaster, supra note 3, at 208; see e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 45-5-407(D)(1)–(3) (2014) (restricting services to persons with financial limitations); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 45-a-651(a)(1) (2014) (restricting services to individuals with assets not exceeding $1,500). 
 44 See Melody M. Kubo, Implementing Olmstead v. L.C.: Defining “Effectively Working” Plans 
for “Reasonably Paced” Wait Lists for Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Pro-
grams, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 731, 732 (2001). Though it references the term, the ADA does not define 
“institutionalization.” See Kevin M. Cremin, Challenges to Institutionalization: The Definition of 
“Institution” and the Future of Olmstead Litigation, 17 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 143, 152 (2012). The U.S. 
Census, however, defines “institutionalized population” as “persons residing in institutional group 
quarters such as adult correctional facilities, juvenile facilities, skilled-nursing facilities, and other 
institutional facilities such as mental (psychiatric) hospitals and in-patient hospice facilities.” U.S. 
Census Bureau, American FactFinder Help Glossary, available at https://ask.census.gov/faq.php?id
=5000&faqId=6669, archived at http://perma.cc/A2M3-XULP (last visited Sept. 2, 2014). 
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the 1950s, states worked to help capable individuals with disabilities live in 
their communities, as opposed to institutions.45 In the 1970s, efforts to elimi-
nate the institutionalization of people with developmental disabilities gained 
traction.46 Congress passed measures designed to reduce and diminish discrim-
ination.47 In addition, communities increased their efforts to move people with 
developmental disabilities out of institutions.48 Despite the push to reform, 
however, widespread isolation and segregation remained.49 
In response to extensive lobbying and demonstrations by the disability 
population, Congress enacted the ADA in 1990.50 With the passage of the 
ADA, Congress intended “to provide a clear and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties.”51 Congress likely endeavored not only to eliminate intentional discrimi-
nation against people with disabilities, but also to address the invisibility in 
society of people who were institutionalized.52 In response to this historical 
isolation, Title II of the ADA included a provision mandating integration.53 
Describing the isolation of people with disabilities as a form of discrimination, 
Congress provided that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by rea-
son of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the bene-
fits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.”54 Thus, Congress sought to eliminate the 
isolation and segregation of persons with disabilities as a type of discrimina-
tion through the enactment of the ADA.55 
Among the regulations implementing Title II, the Attorney General prom-
ulgated the “integration regulation,” requiring public entities to “administer 
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate” to 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Kubo, supra note 44, at 732. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. at 733. Measures to eliminate discrimination based on disability included the 1975 De-
velopmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. 
 48 See id. at 732–33 (explaining that states had some community-based services as early as the 
1950s and that many communities joined deinstitutionalization programs in the 1970s). 
 49 See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 50 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012). 
 51 See id. 
 52 See Salzman, supra note 20, at 184 (citing Senator Paul Simon, commenting that the disabled 
population “remains substantially hidden. They are hidden in institutions . . . nursing homes . . . [and] 
the homes of their families . . . . Because they are hidden, we too easily ignore the problem and the 
need for change”). Notably, the opening provisions of the ADA state that society historically tended to 
isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). 
 53 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). 
 54 §§ 12101(a)(2), (5), 12132. Some members of Congress related the segregation of people with 
disabilities to the historic segregation of African Americans. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 26 
(1990). 
 55 See Salzman, supra note 20, at 184. 
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meet the needs of people with disabilities.56 Pursuant to this regulation, public 
entities must make reasonable modifications to avoid discrimination.57 Rea-
sonable accommodations have often included handicapped accessible equip-
ment, assistance in filling out forms, and extra training.58 States are not re-
quired to make modifications that “would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service, program, or activity.”59 This provision has been open to interpretation 
by courts, who have used it to take costs of state programs into consideration.60 
C. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring: An Overview 
In 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the reasonable modifications 
regulation in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring.61 The Court concluded that Title 
II of the ADA may require that states take action to place people with disabili-
ties in the community rather than institutions.62 In Olmstead, two adult women 
with developmental disabilities and mental illnesses were voluntarily admitted 
to psychiatric units.63 They remained institutionalized for years, despite their 
treatment providers’ determinations that they were able to live in Georgia’s 
community-based settings.64 The plaintiffs brought suit against state officials, 
alleging that the State’s failure to place them in appropriate housing violated 
Title II of the ADA.65 The State argued that there was no discrimination be-
cause the women were not denied placement on the basis of their disabilities, 
nor were they treated differently from other people who were similarly situat-
ed.66 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
                                                                                                                           
 56 28 C.F.R § 35.130(d) (1998). The preamble defines the most integrated setting as “a setting 
that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent pos-
sible.” Id. 
 57 § 35.130(b)(7). 
 58 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (giving examples of what reasonable accommodations may include, such 
as “acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and 
other similar accommodations”). 
 59 § 35.130(b)(7). 
 60 See Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to Personal Assistance Services: “Most Integrated Setting 
Appropriate” Requirements and the Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care, 27 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 17, 31–32 (2001) (stating that these provisions of the ADA have “led the courts to consider the 
costs of state programs in determining whether service for an individual is required in the communi-
ty”); Lucille D. Wood, Costs and the Right to Community-Based Treatment, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 501, 509 (1998) (discussing Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F. Supp. 524 (D. Md. 1996), where the 
court held that relative costs of institutionalization and community-based treatment needed to be de-
termined to assess whether an undue financial burden was present). 
 61 527 U.S. at 587. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 593. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 593–94. The plaintiffs also filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming their right to due 
process had been violated. Id. 
 66 Id. 
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court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that undue institutionali-
zation qualified as discrimination by reason of disability.67 
The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit in part.68 
Specifically, the Court concurred with the Eleventh Circuit that Congress in-
tended a more comprehensive view of discrimination than the one put forth by 
the State.69 Thus, Georgia’s denial of community housing to the plaintiffs con-
stituted discrimination in violation of the ADA.70 Accordingly, when state pro-
fessionals determine that a person can live in the community, and the place-
ment can be reasonably accommodated, states must facilitate the movement of 
this person out of an institution.71 The Court went on to explain that unwar-
ranted institutionalization of individuals with disabilities perpetuates stereo-
types and assumptions about the disabled and mentally ill populations.72 
The Supreme Court disagreed, however, with the lower courts’ interpreta-
tion of the reasonable-modifications regulation.73 The Eleventh Circuit had 
determined that institutional placement for the plaintiffs was more expensive 
for the state than community placement and, therefore, de-institutionalization 
would be a reasonable modification.74 The Supreme Court determined that this 
interpretation did not sufficiently take into consideration that the state’s re-
sources had to provide for a large and diverse population of people with mental 
disabilities.75 The Court instead held that states must have more flexibility to 
maintain a range of facilities.76 Following the Olmstead decision, states were 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 68 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597. 
 69 Id. The majority opinion mentioned that the Department of Justice has consistently advocated 
that undue institutionalization qualifies as discrimination and that its views warrant respect. Id. 
 70 Id. at 597–99. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice 
Antonin Scalia, dissented, stating that the majority opinion used an overly broad concept of discrimi-
nation. See id. at 625 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 71 Id. at 587 (majority opinion). 
 72 Id. at 599 n.10 (comparing the effects of discrimination against disabled people to the stigma-
tizing effects of racial discrimination). Moreover, people living in institutions had fewer opportunities 
than those living in the community to participate in family and social activities, employment and educa-
tional opportunities, and cultural traditions. See id. at 601. Because people with mental disabilities had to 
give up these opportunities in order to receive medical services, while those without mental disabilities 
did not, confining people to institutions without justification constituted discrimination. Id. 
 73 Id. at 603. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion arguing that this part of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s judgment should also have been affirmed. Id. at 607 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 74 Zimring, 138 F.3d at 905. 
 75 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604. The Court reasoned that the lower courts’ construction left the state 
essentially defenseless against automatically providing community placement for everyone deemed eli-
gible. Id. (stating that “sensibly construed, the fundamental-alteration component of the reasonable-
modifications regulation would allow the State to show that, in the allocation of available resources, 
immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable”). 
 76 Id. at 605. As an example, the Court suggested that a reasonably-paced waiting list and effectively 
working plan for moving people to least restrictive settings would satisfy the reasonable-modifications 
standard. Id. at 605–06. 
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encouraged to develop programs to allow people with disabilities to live in 
community housing.77 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ADA AND OLMSTEAD ON HOUSING  
AND PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP 
This Part discusses long-term care, housing, and guardianship statutes in 
light of the ADA and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead v. 
L.C ex rel. Zimring.78 Section A discusses housing and long-term care for el-
ders.79 Then, Section B explains how Olmstead implicates guardianship stat-
utes and summarizes common models and recent reforms to state guardianship 
programs.80 
A. Implications of the ADA on Housing for the Elderly 
The Olmstead decision made clear that segregated housing and institu-
tions constitute discrimination under the ADA.81 Congress passed the ADA 
against the backdrop of severe discrimination against people with both physi-
cal and mental disabilities.82 One of the ADA’s goals was for the public to see 
people with disabilities as individuals who have lives worth living and who 
can meaningfully contribute to their communities.83 Olmstead extended the 
equal rights provided by the ADA to community living by making clear that 
states had an obligation to provide the least restrictive residential setting for 
citizens with disabilities.84 
Although Olmstead focused on plaintiffs who were members of the 
younger disabled population, the situation is similar to that of many older 
adults who find themselves confined to institutional care.85 Over the past few 
decades, academics and social service providers in the gerontological field 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 86. Grants were enacted to support the transition. See Wayne L. 
Anderson et al., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Real Choice Systems Change Grant Program 
23–61 (2006). These included the Presidential New Freedom Initiative of 2001 and Real Choice System 
Change grants. See id. 
 78 See infra notes 81–152 and accompanying text. 
 79 See infra notes 81–101 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 102–151 and accompanying text. 
 81 See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (holding, in an opinion written by Justice 
Ginsburg, that state action to place people with mental disabilities in community settings “is in order 
when the State’s treatment professionals have determined that community placement is appropriate, 
the transfer . . . is not opposed by the individual, and the placement can be reasonably accommodat-
ed”). 
 82 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2012) (stating that Congress found “discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities continues to be a serious and pervasive social problem”). 
 83 Id. 
 84 See 527 U.S. at 587. 
 85 See Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 729. 
2014] Standards for Public Guardians 1227 
have pushed for policies and programs that will assist older adults with their 
daily activities and personal and medical needs within their homes.86 
This focus aligns with the wishes of older adults: a 2000 survey by 
“AARP” found that over eighty percent of people aged forty-five and above 
indicated that they wished to live in their current residences for as long as pos-
sible.87 This phenomenon may be explained by the fact that the majority of 
older adults lived independently until, and even through, old age.88 Having to 
hand over basic decisions and personal care to another person or institution 
presents unique challenges.89 
Trends in long-term care policies have begun to reflect the public’s desire 
to remain at home in old age.90 A number of states have expanded options un-
der Medicaid to allow for more choices for consumers.91 For example, the 
Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services Waiver allowed states to of-
fer federal funds to individuals to use for services in the home or community.92 
Following Olmstead, states focused even more on rebalancing Medicaid funds 
to emphasize home and community care.93 In one rebalancing project, Money 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 78. The “aging in place” phenomenon refers to the desire of 
older adults to live in their own homes and communities, rather than in nursing and rest homes, for as 
long as possible. Id. Another model reflecting this trend is the independent living model, which allows 
people with disabilities to determine and dictate the services and providers they receive in their home. 
See Batavia, supra note 60, at 19. Proponents of the independent living model claim that it promotes the 
goals of the ADA by allowing individuals to remain in their homes and determine their own schedules 
and desires. See id. at 42. Though the independent living model is expected to face resistance from or-
ganizations that benefit under the traditional medical model, it is expected to grow in popularity as older 
adults continue to express their desires to maintain independence. See id. 
 87 AARP, supra note 11, at 24. One reason for this could be the increase in the number of home-
owners. See Felicia Skelton et al., Determining If an Older Adult Can Make and Execute Decisions to 
Live Safely at Home: A Capacity Assessment and Intervention Model, 50 ARCHIVES OF GERONTOLO-
GY & GERIATRICS 300, 300 (2010) (stating that “[o]lder adults commonly report living safely and 
independently in their own home as one of their major life goals”); Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 729; 
see also Eileen E. MaloneBeach & Karen L. Langeland, Boomers’ Prospective Needs for Senior Cen-
ters and Related Services: A Survey of Persons 50-59, 54 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 116, 126 
(2011) (noting elders were concerned with their ability to stay in their own homes and 43 percent 
wondered if current housing would remain suitable as they aged). 
 88 MCINNIS-DITTRICH, supra note 13, at 7 (explaining that despite having more health problems, 
the majority of older adults “are not sick, not poor, and not living in nursing homes”). 
 89 See id. at 114 (stating that maintaining “a sense of control and mastery over their environ-
ments” reduces the risk of depression in older adults); Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1445 (calling the 
responsibility to determine where someone lives “a charge that goes to the core of quality of life”). 
 90 See Batavia, supra note 60, at 22. 
 91 See id.; Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1454 (stating that home health care can include nursing, 
physical therapy, and other clinical services and that states can also offer personal care services under 
the state plan). 
 92 Kubo, supra note 44, at 736. 
 93 See JON PYNOOS ET AL., New Challenges and Growing Trends in Senior Housing, in THE NEW 
POLITICS OF OLD AGE POLICY 324, 330 (Robert B. Hudson ed., 2d ed. 2010) (observing that states 
have had more financial responsibility than the federal government for long-term care and, as a result, 
have been more innovative in their policies). 
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Follows the Person (MFP), individuals can use the money that would have 
been spent on their long-term care in assisted living to move back to and live 
in a community.94 The project provides an example of government using al-
ready-existing funds to support the choices of older and disabled individuals 
while promoting inclusion.95 In addition, communities are being developed 
that take into consideration the needs of older and disabled individuals, avoid-
ing the need to make future accommodations.96 
Despite this progress and the clear preferences of many older adults to 
remain in their homes, many elderly Americans move into nursing homes and 
other institutionalized settings when they and their family members are no 
longer able to provide adequate care.97 This may be due in part to the fact that 
Olmstead did not clarify how much states were required to do to place individ-
uals in less restrictive settings.98 While the Court made clear that individuals 
with disabilities have the right to live in the least restrictive environment pos-
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. at 331. 
 95 See id. In addition to accommodations and proper supports within the home, communities 
themselves should be elder friendly. Dawn Alley et al., Creating Elder-Friendly Communities: Prepa-
rations for an Aging Society, 49 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 1, 14 (2007). Elder-friendly com-
munities may have increased senior housing, transportation, safety measures for pedestrians, and other 
options to meet the needs of older adults living in them. Id. Often, communities are built with the 
needs of younger citizens and families, possibly because elders tend to be left out of the planning 
process and zoning hearings. Id. 
 96 See PYNOOS ET AL., supra note 93, at 331. The authors argue for the importance of accommo-
dations in all new buildings and communities through the concepts of universal design and visitability. 
Id. at 332. Universal design emphasizes the importance of all homes being accessible to those with 
disabilities, so that people who purchase a home at a young age will be able to live there as long as 
they desire and through various medical conditions. Id at 333. Visitability refers only to the aspects of 
a home that affect visitors, such as the entrance, size of the front door, and bathroom accessibility. Id. 
at 332. Supporters of universal design and visitability argue that if settings are made navigable for 
those with the least mobility, all people will benefit. Id. One example of an accommodation for disa-
bilities that resulted in benefits for the general population is the slanted curve at the end of sidewalks. 
Id. For further detail on the suggested requirements for accommodations, see generally Robin Paul 
Malloy, Inclusion by Design: Accessible Housing and Mobility Impairment, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 699 
(2009) (assessing national regulations for building accessibility as well as various local and national 
mechanisms to promote inclusive housing). 
 97 See Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 78 (noting that barriers to aging in place policies often push 
older people toward more restrictive settings such as nursing homes); see also SCHULZ & BINSTOCK, 
supra note 3, at 173 (stating that a person over age sixty-five has a forty percent chance of spending 
some time in a nursing home, and one in five people over age eighty-five is in a nursing home); Bata-
via, supra note 60, at 19 (observing that even when living at home, people with disabilities often have 
little control over their own services, as a result of having to rely on informal support and the medical 
model); Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1450–52 (exploring different types of institutional settings, in-
cluding medically based assisted living, nursing homes, intermediate care facilities, and mental health 
institutions). 
 98 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604–06 (observing that the State must be given leeway in caring for 
a large and diverse population of disabled people, and suggesting that an effectively working plan and 
waiting list could be acceptable); Kubo, supra note 44, at 734 (stating that the Supreme Court in 
Olmstead “did not elaborate what constituted a reasonable pace or an effectively working plan”). 
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sible, and that the states must take action to make this possible, it also indicat-
ed that states do not have to take actions that would be overly burdensome, 
given the high numbers of people with disabilities that might have to be ac-
commodated.99 Accordingly, many advocates of aging-in-place policies found 
troubling the Court’s language allowing states to take into account available 
resources before providing community care for individuals.100 They feared that 
the states would use this language as a loophole to avoid providing people with 
community options.101 
B. Guardianship for Elders In Light of Olmstead 
Guardianship statutes directly affect a state’s adherence to the mandates 
of Olmstead, as guardians are often given discretion over a person’s residence, 
accommodations in the home, and the amount of home care received.102 All of 
these decisions relate substantially to a ward’s level of isolation or inclusion in 
a community.103 The models and statutes used by states to regulate public 
guardianship thus have an impact on the integration of the disabled population 
as a whole.104 Subsection One discusses common models for public guardian-
ship currently used among the states.105 Subsection Two highlights recent 
trends in guardianship statute reform, giving a few recent changes as exam-
ples.106 
1. Common Models for Public Guardianship 
Scholars have classified public guardianship systems into four models, 
which have been used in national studies of public guardianship programs.107 
These four models include the social service agency model, the court model, 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604–06 (stating that the reasonable-modifications regulation should 
be construed to “allow the State to show that, in the allocation of available resources, immediate relief 
for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken for the care 
and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities”). 
 100 See Batavia, supra note 60, at 35–36. Particularly since the recent economic recession, there 
have been fewer community-based options available. See Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1446. 
 101 See Batavia, supra note 60, at 35. 
 102 See Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1475 (explaining that some states require court approval for a 
move to an institution because, under Olmstead, the decision should be a last resort). 
 103 See id. Ward is defined as “A person, usu. a minor, who is under a guardian’s charge or pro-
tection.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1816 (10th ed. 2011). 
 104 See Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1458–59 (stating that “[g]uardians can be the linchpin” that 
makes government programs designed to improve long-term care effective). 
 105 See infra notes 107–124 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 125–151 and accompanying text. 
 107 See Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 729. 
1230 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1217 
independent agency model, and county model.108 Notably, however, many 
states do not fit exactly into one model.109 
The majority of states have public guardianship programs that are housed 
within social service agencies.110 In those states, the agency sometimes pro-
vides services to the same individuals for whom the agency also is the guardi-
an.111 The agencies receive funding from multiple sources, including federal 
funds, grants, private donations, and estates.112 
Some states follow a court model, where the court system houses the pub-
lic guardianship office.113 As of 2005, three states followed this model, estab-
lishing the public guardian as an official of the court.114 The chief judge ap-
points the public guardians, and the court provides a uniform set of rules for 
the entire state.115 The majority of these programs are funded solely through 
the state budget.116 
Others follow the independent agency model, where a state office pro-
vides guardianship, but not direct services, to individuals.117 The public guard-
ian in this model is appointed by and operates as a part of the executive branch 
of government, which four states appeared to utilize in 2005.118 These pro-
grams, which four states appeared to utilize in 2005, received funding through 
their states.119 
Finally, some states locate the public guardianship function at the county 
level.120 Approximately eleven states utilized this scheme as of 2005.121 Some 
of these programs are coordinated at the state level but are carried out at the 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See id. 
 109 Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 209 (citing Bayles & McCartney, supra note 36, whose article 
noted that only a “few states fit the exact organization described in the models,” and explaining that 
the same caveat applies to their article); see, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 20, at 132–33 (describing North 
Dakota’s public guardianship program as a “hybrid of the social service agency model and the county 
model”). 
 110 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 211 (stating that about twenty-eight of the states, out of 
forty-one that had public guardianship statutes, utilized the social service agency model, including 
mental health, disability, or aging services agencies). 
 111 See id. 
 112 Id. at 218. 
 113 Id. at 210. 
 114 Id. (listing Delaware, Hawaii, and Mississippi as the states that utilized the court model at the 
time of the study). 
 115 Id. at 216 (describing how the chief administrative judge of the state has rulemaking power, 
resulting in statewide uniformity). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 210, 216. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. at 210, 218 (listing Alaska, Illinois, Kansas, and New Mexico as states locating their public 
guardianship programs in independent state offices). 
 120 See id. at 211–12. 
 121 Id. at 211. 
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county or regional level.122 The public guardian is appointed by the county 
government, and the offices are regulated by the state attorney general.123 Of 
these programs, only two received state funds; most were funded by the coun-
ties and by client fees.124 
2. Trends in Guardianship Statute Reform 
Guardians frequently make decisions regarding their wards’ residences.125 
Scholars have long advised that institutional placement should happen only as 
a last resort and with third-party review.126 Nonetheless, guardianship still of-
ten is associated with being forced to leave one’s home against one’s wishes.127 
Despite the multiple responsibilities a guardian assumes on behalf of an-
other, and the tension that can arise when making difficult decisions potentially 
against a person’s wishes, no universally recognized set of standards for guard-
ianship exist.128 The United States has at least fifty-one systems of guardian-
ship, and practices of individual courts and guardians vary within each state.129 
Organizations such as the National Guardianship Association suggest that a 
universal standard of guardianship would go a long way toward protecting the 
rights and expectations of older adults and people with disabilities who have 
become incapacitated.130 A national study of public guardianship published in 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 217. 
 124 Id. at 218. 
 125 See Kapp, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that unless a guardianship is explicitly limited, a guardian 
has the authority to make decisions about where and with whom an incapacitated individual will live). 
 126 See Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 560 (advising, in a Model Code written a decade before 
the Olmstead decision, that “the guardian shall not place the ward in an institution . . . without third-
party review . . . even if the ward consents to the actions of the guardian”); Harriet McBryde Johnson 
& Lesly Bowers, Civil Rights and Long-term Care: Advocacy in the Wake of Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel 
Zimring, 10 ELDER L.J. 453, 460 (2002) (advising that elder law attorneys, in the wake of Olmstead, 
should “work aggressively to prevent unwanted confinement” if an elder does not want to live in a 
nursing home, and should seek information about the elder’s daily life and capability to understand 
risks). 
 127 See Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 729 (observing that “[n]otwithstanding Olmstead, a majori-
ty of individuals under public guardianship are institutionalized in most states”); cf. West et al., supra 
note 1, at 5 (reporting that the proportion of the total older adult population residing in nursing homes 
has declined). 
 128 See Hurme & Wood, supra note 29, at 1157. The National Guardianship Association has pro-
duced sets of standards, including a Model Code of Ethics for Guardians and standards of practice for 
guardians and guardianship agencies. Id. at 1163. A Commission on National Probate Court Standards 
included standards for court guardianship in their set of National Probate Court Standards. Id. Yet, 
few courts are aware of these standards. Id. 
 129 See id. at 1162 (noting that there is considerable variance in guardianship programs between 
states and even among courts, judges, and guardians within the same state). 
 130 See id. at 1163. 
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2007 made several recommendations for minimum standards of practice.131 In 
the time since the recommendations were made, however, not all states have 
enacted changes to their guardianship programs.132 Moreover, some states con-
tinue to lack public guardianship systems for older adults.133 
Despite the lack of uniform standards, many states have reformed their 
guardianship programs in recent years.134 Reforms have moved toward thor-
ough assessments of individuals’ cognitive functioning and ability to receive 
and evaluate information, rather than focusing simply on diagnoses.135 Many 
states have put into place extensive protections to better ensure that the poten-
tially incapacitated individual is aware of the role of the guardian and what 
other less restrictive resources may be available.136 In 2013, bills in several 
states addressed the critical issue of capacity assessment.137 For example, Col-
orado put in place professional evaluations by qualified physicians or psy-
chologists for contested guardianship petitions.138 Tennessee also made chang-
es to its capacity requirements, now providing that the examiner’s report shall 
                                                                                                                           
 131 Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 237. The recommendations called for a number of reforms to the 
way guardians are selected, the requirements of the guardians themselves, and minimal standards for 
ongoing services once a guardianship is put in place. Id. 
 132 See Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 728. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 205 (noting changes that had taken place since a 1981 na-
tional survey of public guardianship). 
 135 See ABA Comm’n on Law & Aging, Legislative Updates, http://www.abanet.org/aging/
legislativeupdates/home.html, archived at http://perma.cc/43BB-HL9J; ABA, Capacity Definition & 
Initiation of Guardianship Proceedings (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/law_aging/2014_CHARTCapacityandInitiation.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/37PQ-DWBF; Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 198; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-
14-102(5) (2013) (defining lack of functionality as “lack[ing] ability to satisfy essential requirements 
for physical health, safety, or self-care, even with appropriate and reasonably available technological 
assistance” and requiring that the person be cognitively “unable to effectively receive or evaluate 
information or both or make or communication decisions”). 
 136 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 198 (listing enhanced procedural due process and emphasis 
on limited guardianship as trends in guardianship reform); NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT (1998), 
§ 304(b)(8) (1997), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/guardianship%20and%20
protective%20proceedings/ugppa_final_97.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5S94-LS88 (requiring a 
“reason why limited is inappropriate” when unlimited guardianship is requested); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. 
LAW § 81.02(b) (McKinney 2014) (specifying that the person must be “unable to provide for personal 
needs or property management” and that the court must determine “person is likely to suffer harm”). 
 137 See generally ABA Comm’n on Law and Aging, State Adult Guardianship Legislation: Direc-
tions of Reform, at 18–19 (2013) [hereinafter ABA, Directions of Reform] (summarizing changes to 
guardianship laws in Colorado, Nevada, and Tennessee, all addressing the need for a thorough evalua-
tion of a person’s decision-making ability). 
 138 See id. at 18; S.B. 13-077, 69th Leg., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2013). Nevada and Tennessee made 
changes to capacity assessment as well. ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 18. 
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be prima facie evidence of the respondent’s disability and need for a conserva-
tor, unless the report is “contested and found to be in error.”139 
Some states have reformed statutes further to allow for limited guardian-
ship, enabling people to retain as much autonomy as they are able.140 Histori-
cally, court-appointed guardians were vested with broad and plenary powers.141 
After recent reforms, many state laws instead require that guardianship orders 
be narrowly tailored to meet individuals’ needs.142 Most statutes allow or en-
courage courts to limit the scope of the guardianship to areas where the indi-
vidual lacks capacity to make his or her own decisions.143 In 2013, at least two 
states strengthened the wording of their statutes to explicitly state that certain 
personal rights of the ward should be protected.144 
In addition, states often now require meaningful notice and pleadings 
standards.145 The petitions for guardianship must be brief, clear, and specif-
ic.146 In addition to providing notice to the potential wards themselves, states 
are beginning to expand the list of people who must receive notice, as Nevada 
did in 2013.147 Tennessee, another state that clarified its statutes in 2013, now 
requires that notice be served on the respondent’s closest relatives and any per-
                                                                                                                           
 139 ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 19; S.B. 555, 108th Leg., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 
2013); H.B. 692, 108th Leg., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2013). 
 140 See ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 16. 
 141 See Frolik, supra note 36, at 739 (discussing concerns that guardianship systems in the past 
had become too dependent on plenary guardianships). 
 142 See ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 16; see, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 54.10(d), 
54.25(2)(d)(3), 54.18(1) (2014) (specifying that the guardian “may be granted only those powers nec-
essary to provide . . . in a manner that is appropriate to the ward and constitutes the lease restrictive 
form of intervention” and further clarifying that “[a]ny other right or power is retained by the ward”); 
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 125.315(a), 125.300(3) (2014) (stating that the design of the guardianship must 
encourage “maximum self-reliance and independence” and that the guardian has custody of the pro-
tected person “except to extent of any limitation under the court of appointment”). 
 143 See ABA Comm’n on Law and Aging, Limited Guardianship of the Person, last updated 
12/31/08, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/aging/legislative
updates/pdfs/chart_limited.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5M9K-E5PA; Teaster et al., 
supra note 3, at 212 (noting that virtually all statutes now include language allowing or encouraging 
limited guardianship); see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 524.5-310(c) (2014) (granting guardians “only those 
powers necessitated by ward’s limitations and demonstrated needs”); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & 
TRUSTS § 13-708(a)(1) (2014) (granting guardians “only those powers necessary to provide for the 
demonstrated need of the disabled person”). 
 144 See ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 16; ASSEMB. B. 937 (Ca. 2013) (providing 
that the control of a conservator shall not extend to personal rights including “the right to receive 
visitors, telephone calls, and personal mail, unless specifically limited by a court order”); S.B. 555, 
108th Leg., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2013) (requiring that letters of conservatorship must specify the powers 
that have been removed from the ward, all other powers being retained). 
 145 See ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 2. 
 146 Id. (stating that “specificity . . . as well as clarity and breadth of the notice, are basic safe-
guards to protect rights of the respondent”). 
 147 See id. The persons upon whom notice must be served now include the proposed guardian if 
not the petitioner, the VA if the person receives VA benefits, the Department of Health if the person 
receives Medicaid, and other care providers. Id. 
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son with whom the individual is living.148 In sharp contrast to previous policies 
where judges assigned guardians based simply on medical diagnoses, these 
changes increase the protections for elders by allowing more people, including 
the elder, to contribute to the capacity determination.149 
Altogether, these reforms reflect an increase in societal respect for the au-
tonomy of older and disabled individuals, by discouraging others from filing 
guardianship petitions while the individuals are still mostly able to care for 
themselves.150 This trend is consistent with the growing respect for the disa-
bled community that motivated the enactment of the ADA and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Olmstead.151 
III. HOW STATES CAN USE PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP STATUTES TO MEET THE 
MANDATES OF THE ADA AND OLMSTEAD 
This Part argues that proper oversight of public guardianship can help a 
state fulfill the mandates of the ADA and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1999 deci-
sion in Olmstead v. L.C ex rel. Zimring.152 Section A submits that the balance 
between autonomy and protection sometimes necessitates guardianship and 
that this is particularly true among those who would qualify for public guardi-
anship.153 Section B then argues that, despite its shortcomings, the social ser-
vice agency model is an appropriate model for fulfilling the need.154 Finally, 
Section C provides suggestions for implementing the necessary court oversight 
and holding public guardians accountable.155 
A. The Need for Public Guardianship 
Although guardianship removes some aspects of an individual’s self-
autonomy, the balance between autonomy and protection sometimes requires a 
guardian.156 Some scholars, however, argue that Olmstead requires no guardi-
anship at all.157 Instead, they advocate for supported decision making, where 
                                                                                                                           
 148 See id. 
 149 See id. 
 150 Salzman, supra note 8, at 294; Salzman, supra note 20, at 173. 
 151 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600–01; Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA’s Impact on 
Heath Care for Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 51 (2000). 
 152 See infra notes 156–289 and accompanying text. 
 153 See infra notes 156–182 and accompanying text. 
 154 See infra notes 183–198 and accompanying text. 
 155 See infra notes 199–289 and accompanying text. 
 156 See Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 728 (discussing the vulnerability of “decisionally incapa-
ble” individuals and their need for guardians). 
 157 See Salzman, supra note 20, at 178 (arguing that guardianships unnecessarily isolate wards 
from their communities). In another article, the same scholar argues that even in a community setting, 
guardianship prevents an individual from full participation in society. Salzman, supra note 8, at 283. 
Other alternatives are available as well, if elders are able to plan for their futures before they become 
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trusted family members or other providers make suggestions to a person with 
cognitive limitations rather than becoming the guardian for that person.158 The 
individual retains the ability to make the final decision.159 
This model, however, works best for adults who retain some mental ca-
pacity and who have a trusted friend or family member to be appointed as sup-
ported decision maker.160 The model assumes that a person will be able to ad-
vocate in some way and ultimately can express a decision.161 Public guardian-
ship, on the other hand, assumes that a person does not have family to assist or 
that the family members are abusive or exploiting.162 Public guardianship thus 
is necessary to serve those who are most vulnerable.163 
The process of finding appropriate housing, in particular, often necessi-
tates assistance, especially for individuals in need of public guardians.164 
Guardians can help navigate the housing system on behalf of the individual to 
obtain or maintain community living.165 Without assistance, many of these in-
dividuals end up moving to or remaining in institutions such as nursing 
homes.166  
                                                                                                                           
incapacitated, including using powers of attorney and advance mental health directives. See Ellen A. 
Callegary, Guardianship & Its Alternatives in the 21st Century, 47 JUN MD. B.J. 18, 24 (2014) (dis-
cussing alternatives to guardianship that have improved community support for people with disabili-
ties). 
 158 See Salzman, supra note 20, at 231–32. 
 159 See id. 
 160 See Salzman, supra note 8, at 306; see also Callegary, supra note 157, at 20 (noting that “[i]n 
many cases, guardianship is absolutely necessary” to protect a person,” though a guardian should be 
appointed only as the least restrictive alternative); Schmidt, supra note 20, at 83 (suggesting that for 
people who are incapacitated, a guardian’s ability to make surrogate decisions allows the person to 
remain autonomous). 
 161 See Salzman, supra note 8, at 306. 
 162 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 195–96 (referring to public guardianship wards as “unable 
to care for themselves and typically poor, alone, or ‘different’”); Mary Twomey et al., From Behind 
Closed Doors: Shedding Light on Elder Abuse and Domestic Violence in Late Life, 6 J. CTR. FAMI-
LIES, CHILD. & CTS. 73, 75 (2005) (noting that the majority of elder abuse is perpetuated by family 
members, in particular spouses and adult children). Some possible causes of abuse include mental 
illness or substance abuse of the perpetrator, financial dependency on the victim, and long-term vio-
lent relationships that extend into old age. Twomey et al., supra at 75–76. 
 163 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 83 (observing that people who are incapacitated but do not 
have family or friends to serve as guardians, and cannot afford professional guardians, are “almost 
unimaginably helpless”). 
 164 See Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1454 (discussing waiting lists, limited options, and the need 
for advocacy of guardians); id. at 1458 (explaining that guardians are responsible for society’s most 
at-risk members and are “often . . . the sole line of defense against abuse, neglect, and exploitation”); 
Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 195–96 (describing public guardianship wards as “unable to care for 
themselves and typically poor, alone, or ‘different’”). 
 165 See generally Karp et al., supra note 6 (discussing ways in which guardians can facilitate 
residential decisions and often prolong an individual’s ability to stay in the community). 
 166 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 136 (finding that money was saved in residential costs per 
client because people under public guardianship were relocated to less restrictive homes); see also 
Robin Fields et al., Guardians for Profit (Part Four): For Most Vulnerable, a Promise Abandoned, 
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Maintaining community housing for those who already have it aligns with 
the mandates of Olmstead, since allowing people to live in their communities 
with people of all ages and abilities promotes the Olmstead goals of inclusion 
and integration.167 As the Supreme Court held in Olmstead, states are constitu-
tionally mandated to take action to ensure inclusion and integration.168 Proper-
ly functioning public guardianship programs could work alongside existing 
programs by providing support to help more elders keep their homes.169 Ac-
cordingly, failing to provide assistance to people who are incapacitated could 
lead to a greater proportion of the disabled and older populations living in in-
stitutions.170 Public guardianship can help states fulfill the mandates of 
Olmstead by allowing those who would otherwise end up institutionalized to 
remain in their homes with some assistance.171 
Staying in one’s home, however, can be challenging and require support 
and advocacy.172 A number of practical barriers make it difficult for older 
adults to remain in their own homes, despite the agreement among profession-
als and elderly citizens that living at home is preferable.173 For one, houses are 
not often built to accommodate older adults as they become frailer.174 When 
                                                                                                                           
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A1 (telling the story of an elder who died soon after being placed in a 
nursing home, after an underfunded public guardianship agency declined to take her case). If the per-
son needing guardianship has mental illness, he or she might have more serious physical ailments as 
well. Sherry M. Cummings & Nancy P. Kropf, Aging with a Severe Mental Illness: Challenges and 
Treatments, 54 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 175, 176 (2011) (finding that people with severe 
mental illness experience increased physical illnesses as they age). 
 167 See Olmstead v. L.C, 527 U.S. 581, 600–01 (1999); Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 85. The 
“aging in place” programs work to put in place systematic protections, in hopes that more elders will 
be able to stay in their homes. See generally Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 78 (discussing the need for 
and challenges of providing age-friendly housing and arguing for policies that promote the option to 
age in place). 
 168 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587; Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 230 (stating that Olmstead pro-
vides a powerful mandate to fund public guardianship programs). 
 169 See Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1446 (stating that “guardians are a key piece in the puzzle for 
policy-makers in designing a workable system for long-term supports and services”); Teaster et al., 
supra note 3, at 233. 
 170 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 136; Fields et al., supra note 166. 
 171 Schmidt, supra note 20, at 139 (providing examples of people helped by public guardianship, 
including an eighty-three-year-old woman who suffered malnutrition and severe beatings while living 
with an abusive son, before a hospital pursued guardianship on her behalf); Karp et al., supra note 6, 
at 1461–62 (providing several case examples of individuals who avoided institutional care due to the 
interventions of their guardians). 
 172 SCHULZ & BINSTOCK, supra note 3, at 233; see also Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 81 (finding 
that older adults may restrict their activities and put themselves at future risk for institutionalization 
due to the unmet needs for supportive features in their homes). Approximately one million older peo-
ple have unmet needs, including hand rails, grab bars, and accessible bathrooms. See Pynoos et al., 
supra note 1, at 81; U.S. Dep’t of House. & Urban Dev., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Supplement to the 
American Housing Survey for the United States 90 tbl.2-15 (2001). 
 173 See Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 78. 
 174 Id. at 81. Many older adults require assistance with activities of daily living and have difficulty 
climbing stairs. Id; see also West et al., supra note 1, at 5 (reporting that over thirty-eight percent of 
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older adults are no longer mobile and functional within their own homes, they 
become at risk for falls and injuries, and have an overall greater dependence on 
others.175 For a number of reasons, older adults are often unable to easily mod-
ify their own homes.176 
Furthermore, an individual’s health or other considerations may necessi-
tate a move to more restricted living against his or her wishes.177 This occurs 
when a person’s safety is truly endangered and the person does not have the 
decision-making capacity to avoid this danger.178 Occasionally, the person un-
der guardianship agrees with the assessment and makes the choice to move to a 
more restrictive setting.179 Even when the ward agrees with the decision, the 
transition may involve long waiting lists, thorough searches for the appropriate 
institution, and the selling of a home, among other issues.180 The various as-
pects of relocation can be overwhelming, and changes in location can be dis-
turbing for people who have dementia.181 Guardians can play an important role 
in facilitating the process by handling the situation with care and respect.182 
                                                                                                                           
adults over 65 had disabilities in 2010 and that the most common difficulties were walking, climbing 
stairs, and doing errands alone). 
 175 Pynoos et al., supra note 1, at 81 (stating that falls are often the outcome of home hazards and 
lack of supportive features). One scholar cites statistics from surveys performed by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, finding that approximately one-third of people over age sixty-five 
living in the community experience a fall each year, and over three-quarters of these falls take place in 
and around the home. Id. at 80; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WHAT YOU CAN DO TO PREVENT FALLS 2 (2008), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/pubs/English/brochure_Eng_desktop-a.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/B2CR-UAHD. 
 176 See Pynoos, supra note 1, at 82. Reasons include lack of expertise, psychological barriers, and 
insufficient funding. Id. 
 177 See Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1459. Scholars debate whether guardians should use a “best 
interest” standard, resembling a parent-child relationship, or a “substituted decision” standard, making 
the decision the ward would have made before he or she became incapacitated, even if this decision 
does not appear best to the guardian. See Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 545. Some scholars sug-
gest that in most situations, guardians ethically should defer to the substituted decision standard. Id. at 
548. The Uniform Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act uses a hybrid of the best interest and 
substituted decision standards. See Johns, supra note 3, at 1558; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 136, § 214(a)-(b). 
 178 Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1459. 
 179 See id. 
 180 See id. 
 181 See id. 
 182 See id. Sometimes, however, guardians assist wards with moving to institutions when the 
transition is unwanted. See Robin Fields et al., Guardians for Profit (Part One): When a Family Mat-
ter Turns into a Business, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005, at A1 (describing a conservator who moved a 
95-year-old woman to a care home without informing the woman’s daughter); see, e.g., Jack Leonard 
et al., Guardians for Profit (Part Two): Justice Sleeps While Seniors Suffer, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2005, at A1 (telling the stories of conservators who arranged to purchase their clients’ homes for 
themselves or allowed their own family members to live with them after moving the elder to a nursing 
home). 
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B. The Social Service Agency Model Can Meet the Mandates of Olmstead 
Several scholars have observed that the social service agency model of 
public guardianship contains an inherent conflict of interest, as agencies have 
an incentive to steer their wards toward services provided by the agency.183 
These scholars fear that under this model, if a ward is unable to pay or is un-
willing to utilize other services offered by the agency, the agency will not zeal-
ously advocate for the interests of that individual.184 Accordingly, these schol-
ars argue that this model is inherently unsuccessful and should be avoided by 
states.185 
While the conflict of interest is disconcerting, this argument overlooks 
one reason the social service agency model may be so popular among states: 
the agencies providing direct services to individuals are often the ones most 
familiar with the individuals’ situations and needs.186 If an elder has few or no 
family members or friends, the person who sees him or her the most may be a 
social worker or volunteer from an agency.187 The elder’s need for assistance 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 98 (stating that the social service agency model presents a clear 
conflict of interest); Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 230 (expressing concern that the model “presents a 
grave conflict of interest”); Lou Ann Anderson, Abusive Guardianships and Their Liberty-looting, 
Property-poaching Nature (TX), ESTATE OF DENIAL: SHINING LIGHT ON THE DARK SIDE OF ESTATE 
MANAGEMENT (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.estateofdenial.com/2014/04/03/abusive-guardianships-and-
their-liberty-looting-property-poaching-nature-tx/, archived at http://perma.cc/7K89-E29N (opining 
that protective services employees often take part in questionable guardianship cases, and agencies 
often “derive direct or indirect benefit from abusive probate actions). 
 184 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 230. For example, if a protective service agency served as 
guardian, the guardian might feel pressured to push a ward toward services provided by the agency or 
not to advocate for scarce resources within the agency. Lori Stiegel & Ellen Klem, Explanation of the 
“Adult Protective Services Agency Authority to Act as Guardian of a Client: Guidance and Provisions 
from Adult Protective Services Laws, but State” Chart, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/aging/about/pdfs/APS_as_Guardian_Explanation.auth
checkdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z5TL-H5LN. Furthermore, the protective services agency 
may need to investigate allegations of abuse by a public guardian. Id. To minimize this risk, states can 
prohibit protective service agencies from acting as guardians for their clients or limiting the agency to 
serving as temporary guardian. Id. 
 185 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 236 (expressing concern over a social service agency repre-
sentative’s ability to “effectively and freely advocate for the ward”). 
 186 See Winsor C. Schmidt et al., Study Finds Certified Guardians with Legal Work Experience 
Are at Greater Risk for Elder Abuse than Certified Guardians with Other Work Experience, 7 
NAELA J. 171, 191–92 (2011) (suggesting that the work of a guardian—often involving social sup-
port, activities of daily living, and caregiver support—might more closely resemble that of a social 
services worker than legal work). See generally Karp et al., supra note 6; 
 187 See generally Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1461–62 (discussing ways in which the needs of 
individuals can be addressed by the workers of social service agencies, who often provide very basic 
day-to-day services). But see Campbell Killick & Brian J. Taylor, Professional Decision Making on 
Elder Abuse: Systematic Narrative Review, 21 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 211, 211 (2009) (review-
ing literature finding that practitioners often have little insight or guidance for decision making). 
Opinions about effectiveness and potential harm to the elder were factors in whether adult protection 
workers responded to potential abuse. Id. at 229. There are complex ethical dilemmas for these service 
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may not come to the attention of anyone else who would potentially petition 
for guardianship.188 
Furthermore, employees and administrators of public service agencies are 
frequently involved in advocating for better services and attend trainings on 
the needs of the population they serve.189 Thus, the same individuals who are 
guardians and regularly visit the wards have been trained in issues that affect 
elders.190 For this system of guardianship, there is no need to create an office 
or new commission, as the guardianship program is set up within agencies that 
already exist.191 
In addition, people who work in social service agencies already undergo 
training for their jobs and familiarize themselves with current issues regarding 
guardianship.192 Many scholars have emphasized that potential guardians 
should be trained in general psychology as well as elder-specific issues, in-
cluding depressive symptoms, illnesses common to elders, medications, and 
suicide risk and capacity.193 In addition, guardians, or the volunteers who 
                                                                                                                           
providers and possibly inadequate supervision or guidance for them to navigate these issues. See id. at 
228. 
 188 See generally Karp et al., supra note 6. This is particularly important for elders who have 
severe mental illness. See Cummings & Kropf, supra note 166, at 176. If the elders were mentally ill 
for much of their lives, they might enter older adulthood without children or social supports and with 
minimal education or access to resources. See id. at 177. These factors suggest that this population 
might be particularly likely to need public guardianship. See id; see also Namkee G. Choi & James 
Mayer, Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation: Risk Factors and Prevention Strategies, J. GERONTO-
LOGICAL SOC. WORK, Oct. 2000, at 6 (stating that maltreated elders tend be over eighty years old, 
frail, and suffering from cognitive and mental impairments). 
 189 See Regina M. Bures et al., Strengthening Geriatric Social Work Training: Perspectives from 
the University at Albany, 39 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 111, 118–24 (2003) (describing the 
Hartford Initiative, which seeks to train social work students, many of whom will go on to work in 
social service agencies that target elders, on elder-specific issues). 
 190 See Elisia Gatmen Kupris, Protection of Our Elderly: A Multidisciplinary Collaborative Solu-
tion for Alaska, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 47, 57 (2013) (suggesting that increased education and training 
could benefit physicians, other service providers, and non-professionals in recognizing and reporting 
potential elder abuse). But see Kelly Mills-Dick et al., Evaluation Through Collaboration: A Model 
Program of Agency-Based Training in Geriatric Social Work, 50 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 
39, 53 (2007) (arguing that agencies do not have the benefit of cutting-edge research and that continu-
ing education programs frequently do not address the issues of aging). 
 191 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 210. 
 192 See Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1458 (noting that although the guardian may be a stranger to 
the ward, he or she may have familiarity with the social service system); Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 
219 (finding that the independent state office and social service agency models had more mechanisms 
for staff training and evaluation than the court and county models); see also MCINNIS-DITTRICH, 
supra note 13, at 353 (describing the purpose and establishment of Area Agencies on Aging and stat-
ing that they were designed “to promote good health among older adults so that they . . . could age in 
place more successfully”). 
 193 See generally MCINNIS-DITTRICH, supra note 13 (addressing biological, physical, and social 
assessment issues of which geriatric social workers should be aware). Suicide and depression rates in 
elders are very high, particularly among those who are isolated. Id. at 223 (suggesting that older adults 
who lacked connections to family and friends may feel they would not be missed if they died). De-
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spend time face-to-face with the wards, should recognize the differences be-
tween true incapacitation and mere confusion.194 Staff members of social ser-
vice agencies likely have received much of this training in mandated orienta-
tion or ongoing trainings.195 
Thus, the benefits of the social service agency model mitigate its short-
comings.196 For states that already use this model with some success, steps can 
be taken to reduce the potential effect of the conflict of interest, rather than 
avoid the model completely.197 The social service agency model has the poten-
tial to meet the mandates of Olmstead and the ADA, if the agencies train the 
guardians they employ to promote independence and community living, and if 
proper safeguards, discussed in the following sections, are in place.198 
C. Guarding the Guardians: Ensuring Public Guardianship Programs Help 
Rather Than Harm 
Generally, those who require public guardians are among the most vul-
nerable in the population.199 They often have no family members or nearby 
friends to advocate for them or help them make decisions.200 Furthermore, 
there is often no one to hold the guardians accountable for their conduct, as the 
wards themselves have been deemed incompetent.201 Thus, the need for over-
                                                                                                                           
pression in older adults is commonly underdiagnosed and undertreated. Id. at 111. Adjustment disor-
der is also prevalent, particularly after life-changing events such as the loss of a partner or retirement. 
Id. 
 194 Id. at 64 (discussing changes to the brain and memory associated with aging and differentiat-
ing between memory loss and merely taking longer to access a memory). 
 195 See id. at 8–12, 353. But see Austin G. Rinker, Recognition and Perception of Elder Abuse by 
Prehospital and Hospital-Based Care Providers, 48 ARCHIVES OF GERONTOLOGY & GERIATRICS 
110, 115 (2009) (finding’ that there was ambiguity between what is perceived and what is reported by 
providers). The researchers suggest that a statewide training program is needed to ensure prehospital 
and hospital care providers are aware of the signs of elder neglect and their duty to report abuse. Id. 
 196 See MCINNIS-DITTRICH, supra note 13, at 8–12, 353. 
 197 See Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 548 (speculating that with a guardian who develops an 
ongoing relationship with the ward and service providers, and encourages personal growth, an adult 
with developmental disabilities will be able to benefit from less restrictive settings and function more 
independently). 
 198 See id. 
 199 See Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 728. 
 200 Jeff Kelly et al., Courts Strip Elders of Their Independence, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2008, at A1 
(referring to elders without relatives or friends to serve as guardians as “unbefriended elders”). 
 201 Id. (stating that in cases concerning elders without family or close friends, judges depend on 
the assertions of petitioners when determining whether a person is incapacitated). Furthermore, the 
reporters found that after the probate court appointed a guardian, they did not track or monitor the 
ward to determine if the guardianship continued to be necessary or “even learn whether they are alive 
or dead.” Id. Elder law attorneys surmised that judges spent less time on guardianship cases due to the 
fact they were unlikely to be adversarial. Id. (quoting Laura A. Sanford, an elder law attorney). 
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sight over public guardianships may be even greater than the need to hold oth-
er guardians responsible.202 
This Part proposes important steps that states can take to minimize the 
risks public guardianships can pose to elders.203 As has been recommended by 
national studies of public guardianship, states should have written policies in 
place, in order to provide consistent rules and practices in offices across the 
state.204 To the same end, states should develop uniform reporting forms, elec-
tronic reporting, and periodic compilation of the information reported to the 
state.205 All of these improvements would streamline the guardianship offices 
within the states.206 Furthermore, they would provide data for more funding 
and for justification of the programs to state legislatures.207 
Subsection 1 of this section argues that temporary or partial guardianship 
is one way to bring statutes in compliance with the ADA, by allowing adults 
who have capacity to make their own housing decisions whenever possible.208 
Subsection 2 then emphasizes the importance of court oversight and guardian 
accountability.209 Subsection 3 argues that proper funding of guardianship pro-
grams also could work to minimize the risk of neglect by public guardians.210 
1. Limited Guardianship 
Public guardianship statutes should emphasize that temporary or partial 
guardianship is to be awarded whenever possible.211 Doing so would provide 
individuals with greater autonomy in areas where they can take care of them-
                                                                                                                           
 202 See Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 545 (stating that public guardians and public guardian-
ship organizations may need to adopt standards beyond those included in a model code, due to the 
particular dangers of public guardianship); see also Fields et al., supra note 182 (explaining that con-
servatorship began as a way to help families protect their relatives from predators and self-neglect, but 
over the years became a profession that is often corrupt). 
 203 See infra notes 204–289 and accompanying text. 
 204 Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 237. 
 205 Id. at 237; Kelly et al., supra note 200. 
 206 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 237. 
 207 Id. Scholars have noted that Virginia was the only state adequately tracking the amount saved 
by the state through their public guardianship program. Id. They recommended that other states use 
Virginia’s tracking system as a model. Id. 
 208 See infra notes 211–231 and accompanying text. 
 209 See infra notes 232–275 and accompanying text. 
 210 See infra notes 276–289 and accompanying text. 
 211 See generally Frolik, supra note 36 (exploring possible motivations for judges to prefer plena-
ry over limited guardianships and discussing the benefits of limited guardianship). Several states in-
clude these provisions already. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-5303(B)(8) (2014) (”If a general 
guardianship is requested, the petition must state . . . why limited is not appropriate); PA. CONS. STAT 
§ 5512.1(a) (2014) (“The court shall prefer limited guardianship.”); VT. STAT. ANN. § 3069(c) (2014) 
(“The court shall grant powers to the guardian in the least restrictive manner appropriate to the cir-
cumstances.”). 
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selves while providing assistance in areas where they need it.212 If individuals 
who were capable of making housing decisions and navigating the system re-
tained the authority to do so, a greater number of older adults who were capa-
ble of maintaining community living presumably would choose to remain in 
the community.213 Greater numbers of older adults in the community would 
increase the integration of the older adult population.214 Thus, statutes provid-
ing for limited guardianship would help states fulfill the mandates of 
Olmstead.215 
Proper use of temporary and partial guardianships could ease the burden 
of public guardians, as well as increase the autonomy of wards.216 Using Ten-
nessee’s revised statute as a model, states should require that orders for guardi-
anship or conservatorship explicitly state the rights that have been removed 
from the individual, with the individual retaining all other rights.217 Easing the 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See Frolik, supra note 36, at 748–49. People who are unable to make proper medical decisions 
or properly care for themselves, but are still able to make most decisions including where to reside, 
should not have these decisions placed in the hands of others. See id. Sometimes, even when a person 
appears to be totally incapacitated, a fine-tuned assessment will show that they have some areas of 
decision-making capability. See ABA COMM’N ON LAW AND AGING, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOC. & NAT’L COLLEGE OF PROBATE JUDGES, JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF CAPACITY OF OLDER 
ADULTS IN GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 2 (2006) [hereinafter ABA, 
HANDBOOK], available at http://www.apa.org/pi/aging/resources/guides/judges-diminished.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/XVM9-B4MR. But see Salzman, supra note 20, at 176 (arguing that even 
with limited guardianship, others may treat the individual as if he or she were fully incapacitated). 
 213 See AARP, supra note 11, at 24 (finding that 80 percent of people aged forty-five and older 
wished to remain in their homes as long as possible). Sometimes, however, guardians and conserva-
tors take advantage of the need for home improvement by making changes that the elder does not truly 
need or want. See Fields et al., supra note 182 (giving an example of a conservator who made expen-
sive changes to an elder’s home, including paying her own sister $1,550 to paint the house, using the 
elder’s money). This emphasizes that it is vital for guardians to communicate with the people they 
serve and that the guardianship should be limited to those areas that are truly needed. See id. 
 214 See AARP, supra note 11, at 24. There are many reasons to encourage older adults to stay in 
their communities, for the benefit of society as well as the elders themselves. See Alley et al., supra 
note 95, at 2 (explaining that older adults contribute to communities in many ways, including devoting 
time and energy to local issues, participating as volunteers, and giving to charity organizations); 
Kupris, supra note 190, at 47 (stating that Alaskan seniors are employers, employees, volunteers and 
“the pioneers who developed our state and continue to improve the communities where they live”) 
(citation omitted). Older adults may feel more committed to their communities than their younger 
neighbors, as they may have lived in their homes for many years. See Kupris, supra note 190, at 47. 
 215 See Frolik, supra note 36, at 752. 
 216 See id. at 750–51. 
 217 See ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 2 (reporting that Tennessee SB 555 and 
HB692 changed the definition of the “conservator” from a focus on supervision and assistance to “the 
exercise of ‘the decision-making rights and duties . . . in one or more areas in which the person lacks 
capacity’” and further provides that “the letters of conservatorship must either recite the specific pow-
ers removed . . . or have attached the court order specifying the powers removed, all other powers 
being retained by the individual”); see also ABA, HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 2 (listing examples 
of rights that may be retained by the individual, including the right to spend small amounts of money, 
make choices about roommates and leisure activities, and determine participation in religious activi-
ties). 
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burden of public guardians would promote the goals of Olmstead by allowing 
guardians to devote proper amounts of energy to individual wards.218 Guardi-
ans would be able to devote more time to advocating for individual needs, in-
cluding home adaptations and placements in communities.219 
Moreover, temporary or partial guardianship should be granted only when 
it is truly the least restrictive option.220 Most guardianship statutes currently 
include this requirement.221 Statutes also should state explicitly that a judge 
should seek as many viewpoints as possible, including those of professionals, 
relatives, and neutral evaluators, and allow the elder him or herself a chance to 
speak at the hearing or by videotape.222 Clear guidelines for determining ca-
pacity should be stated within the statute, and an independent psychiatric eval-
uation should be performed whenever possible.223 All of these changes would 
work to ensure that judges award guardianship only when less restrictive op-
tions, such as home care, money management, or nursing services, will not 
meet the needs of the individual.224 These standards engender respect for an 
elder’s autonomy, make clear that removing decision-making authority should 
be a last resort, and thus promote the values of Olmstead.225 
To minimize the risk of removing more personal autonomy than is appro-
priate, legal representation should be provided for the elders.226 For example, 
elders who are served with petitions for guardianship may not understand the 
                                                                                                                           
 218 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 212. 
 219 See id. 
 220 See ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 16. 
 221 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-1 (2014) (intending to “make available least restrictive form 
of guardianship”); TENN. CODE § 34-1-127 (2014) (stating that the “[c]ourt has affirmative duty to 
ascertain and impose the least restrictive alternatives”). 
 222 See ABA, HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 3. A handbook designed by the ABA gives guide-
lines for judges who assess capacity in elders. Id. The handbook suggests that judges engage in five 
different steps to determine capacity: screening the case, gathering information, conducting the hear-
ing, making the determination, and ensuring oversight if the guardian is appointed. Id. Throughout the 
five steps, the judge should review six factors: medical condition, cognition level, everyday function-
ing, values and preferences, risk and level of supervision, and means to enhance capacity. Id. But see 
Fields et al., supra note 182 (finding that court oversight was “erratic and superficial” despite re-
quirements in place to ensure oversight). 
 223 See ABA, HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 3. Gerontologic clinicians proposed a model that 
take multiple domains into consideration when assessing capacity. See Skelton et al., supra note 87, at 
301. The suggested domains are 1) personal needs and hygiene, 2) the condition of the home envi-
ronment, 3) activities for independent living, 4) medical self-care, including medication management 
and illness self-monitoring, and 5) financial affairs. Id. Scholars reiterate that guardianship should be 
considered only as a last resort. Id. at 304. They suggest that clinicians should provide capacity as-
sessments to the court that include 1) decision making capacity, 2) capacity to carry out a plan and 
live independently, 3) dangerous activities resulting from living alone, and 4) activities that may en-
danger others. Id. 
 224 See Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 549. 
 225 See id. 
 226 See Salzman, supra note 20, at 175–56 (stating that wards often have no enforceable right to 
participate in the process). 
1244 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1217 
document for a number of reasons, including poor vision, limited reading 
skills, or simply a lack of understanding of the legal system—none of which 
limit a person’s ability to make decisions for him or herself.227 Providing legal 
representation for elders thus reduces the risk that a person who has the capaci-
ty to make decisions will be found in need of guardianship.228 
All of these safeguards would help reduce the risks inherent in the social 
service agency model while promoting the dignity and integration of older and 
disabled adults.229 One concern about the social service agency model, em-
ployed by the majority of states, is that the same agency who will serve as 
guardian has the ability to petition for guardianship.230 Emphasizing partial and 
limited guardianships, ensuring that the court hears opinions from a number of 
service providers and acquaintances, and providing independent legal repre-
sentation to speak directly with the elder would all work to mitigate this poten-
tial conflict of interest in the social service agency model.231 
2. Judicial Oversight and Guardian Accountability 
The court’s role in maintaining accountability with public guardians re-
mains crucial, given the inability of incapacitated wards to hold them respon-
sible.232 Scholars have suggested that public guardians should be held to higher 
standards than known guardians for this reason.233 Most states give the same 
                                                                                                                           
 227 See MCINNIS-DITTRICH, supra note 13, at 38 (explaining that changes in vision are a natural 
part of aging); see also Linda S. Whitton, Everything You Ever Needed to Know About Good Lawyer-
ing, You Can Learn from Elder Law, 40 STETSON L. REV. 73, 85–86 (2010) (discussing a spectrum of 
capacity and explaining that a client should not be considered incapacitated or irrational unless he or 
she has truly lost the ability to understand the nature and consequences of their decisions); Skelton, et 
al., supra note 87, at 300–01 (explaining that capacity can be viewed as a gradient and that an elder 
not conforming to social norms should not be confused with having impaired capacity); Joan L. 
O’Sullivan & Diane E. Hoffman, The Guardianship Puzzle: Whatever Happened to Due Process?, 7 
MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 11, 40–41 (1995) (discussing the importance of judges observing and 
speaking to allegedly incapacitated persons whenever possible before making a decision, since 
“[t]here is no bright line dividing the competent from the incompetent”). 
 228 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 238. 
 229 See id. 
 230 See id. (recommending that states avoid a social services agency model due to its inherent 
conflict of interest and expressing concern that guardians under this type of program could not effec-
tively advocate for the ward). 
 231 See id. 
 232 See Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 545 (referring to particular dangers presented by public 
guardianship programs); Leonard et al., supra note 182 (stating that elders under guardianship often 
have no friends or family to advocate for them). 
 233 See Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 545 (suggesting that public guardians may need to adopt 
standards beyond those expected of other guardians to account for the particular issues associated with 
public guardianships). A Los Angeles Times article noted, for example, serious concerns with guardi-
ans moving wards to nursing homes and selling homes to themselves and their family members. See 
Leonard et al., supra note 182. Though these were paid professional guardians, they illustrate the 
necessity of taking extra precautions when the guardian is previously unknown to the ward, and the 
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duties and powers to public guardians that are given to other guardians.234 De-
spite the extensive administrative work these requirements entail, they are im-
portant for the protection of wards.235 
In order to fulfill the mandates of Olmstead, people who live in institu-
tions should be regularly evaluated to ensure that institutionalization is still the 
least restrictive form of housing available to them.236 Proper evaluation thus 
requires frequent visits by the guardian to observe the individual within his or 
her environment.237 If an individual’s public guardian visits rarely or never, the 
purpose of public guardianship will be frustrated.238 Thus, public guardianship 
statutes should include standards for the number of times per year a ward must 
be visited in person.239 
In addition, to ensure that guardians are fulfilling their duties of visitation, 
guardians should provide comprehensive reports to the court every year.240 
Visits should have specific requirements, including questionnaires and check-
lists to ensure that guardians are making a concerted effort to make contact 
with wards.241 Moreover, steps should be put in place to ensure that the guardi-
                                                                                                                           
ward has no family or friends to serve as advocate. See id. Even when there is an advocate, it can be 
difficult to remove a court-appointed guardian. See id. 
 234 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 212. Some statutes, however, provide extra duties for public 
guardians, including minimum visits to the ward per year, maintaining detailed records, and adhering 
to individualized service plans. See id. 
 235 See id. at 239. Due to limited resources, courts are sometimes reluctant to adopt monitoring 
practices that could improve their guardianship programs. See U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Office, 
GAO-11-678, Incapacitated Adults: Oversight of Federal Fiduciaries and Court-Appointed Guardi-
ans Needs Improvements, Report to the Chairman, Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate 16 
(2011) (advocating for the federal government to support evaluation of the feasibility and effective-
ness of monitoring practices, so that courts with limited resources would be more willing to invest in 
them). 
 236 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 229 (calling for a “re-evaluation of the high proportion of 
public guardianship clients who are institutionalized”). 
 237 See id. See generally Kelly et al., supra note 200 (providing examples of individuals who 
remained as guardians after failing to visit and document progress). 
 238 Kelly et al., supra note 200 (reporting one case where the lack of frequent contact might have 
led to the administration of antipsychotic drugs without a required separate guardianship hearing); see 
Evelyn Larrubia et al., Guardians for Profit (Part Three): Missing Money, Unpaid Bills and Forgotten 
Clients, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at A1 (describing a court-appointed guardian whose neglect 
caused people to lose health insurance, receive late rent notices, and miss medical appointments due to 
not having bus fare). 
 239 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 87–88 (citing the North Dakota Guardianship Standard 13(V), 
stating that guardians “shall visit the ward monthly”); Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 240 (recommend-
ing a minimum of one visit per month); Kelly et al., supra note 200 (interviewing wards who were 
visited only once per year or not at all during a year). 
 240 See Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 549. 
 241 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 239 (recommending uniform computerized forms); Fields et 
al., supra note 166 (noting a particularly egregious case where two years passed between a referral for 
guardianship and the guardian realizing the client had died, including one visit where the guardian left 
after being told the ward had gone for a walk and did not check in for three more months). 
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an takes the time to hear the ward’s concerns.242 Questionnaires and summaries 
of the visits should be filed with the probate court annually.243 These precau-
tions would promote the goals of Olmstead by reducing the potential for isola-
tion of wards in residences that are more restrictive than is appropriate.244 
Furthermore, detailed forms, including checklists, provide safeguards to 
ensure that guardians complete evaluations regarding the necessity of institu-
tionalization, and assess whether a ward desires or is able to return to commu-
nity living.245 Several states, like Tennessee in 2013, revised their procedures 
for holding guardians accountable.246 Tennessee further states that reports on 
the wards’ physical and mental conditions may not be excused, waived, or ex-
tended even for good cause.247 This requirement, if followed by courts, will 
allow for much greater protection for individuals.248 It will require that guardi-
ans see wards in person and, if used properly, will increase the chances that 
individuals who no longer require guardianship will be identified and their 
rights to self-determination reinstated.249 
In addition to accountability, court approval for major decisions is essen-
tial.250 In some states, guardians are granted authority to make a wide variety 
of decisions on behalf of the ward, including selling property, making other 
                                                                                                                           
 242 Kelly et al., supra note 200. The ABA’s handbook for judges includes a sample form for 
guardians to submit to the court annually. See ABA, HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 32. 
 243 See ABA, Directions of Reform supra note 137, at 20. 
 244 See Hardy, supra note 13, at 18. 
 245 See ABA, HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 32 (providing a Model Annual Report for Guardian 
of Person and Estate and containing spaces to note the number of times the guardian had contact with 
the person; the individual’s current physical, mental, and cognitive functioning and any changes noted 
during the past year; therapy, recreation and other activities; and thorough financial accounting); see 
also Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 553–54 (recommending in a model code that guardians seek 
out the preferences of the ward even for seemingly minor decisions). A ward’s preferences should be 
overruled by the guardian only when the guardian is “reasonably certain that substantial harm will 
result” from the ward’s choice. Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 553–54. If the ward is unable to 
communicate his or her preferences, the guardian should look to background information, including 
any indications of preference that the ward has made in the past. Id. The guardian should also seek 
insight from the ward’s caregivers and any other sources of information. Id. 
 246 ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 20. Tennessee now requires the filing of an 
accounting six months after the guardian is appointed and annually after that. See id. at 2; S.B. 555, 
108th Leg., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2013); H.B. 692, 108th Leg., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2013). These positive 
changes, however, will not effect change if they are not enforced. See Larrubia et al., supra note 238 
(recounting a case where a conservator did not file financial reports but still was appointed conserva-
tor for twenty-seven more people). 
 247 See Tenn. S.B. 555; Tenn. H.B. 692; ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 20. 
 248 See Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 549 (stating that the guardian should make decisions on 
behalf of the ward only after considering all available information about the ward’s preferences, in-
cluding verbal and nonverbal communications). 
 249 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587; Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 549. 
 250 See generally Leonard et al., supra note 182 (giving numerous examples of elders who were 
taken advantage of by guardians and conservators due to inadequate oversight by the court). 
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financial decisions, and making end-of-life decisions.251 Due to the risk of 
overburdened public guardians and lack of personal relationships, public 
guardians should be required to obtain court approval for most major deci-
sions.252 This may be particularly important for public guardians under a social 
service agency system, due to the inherent conflict of interest in these sys-
tems.253 Requiring court approval for major decisions would greatly reduce 
this risk.254 Courts should carefully scrutinize, in particular, decisions made by 
social service agencies with a pecuniary interest.255 
In particular, the decision to move a ward to more restrictive housing such 
as a nursing home should require court approval, as this decision could in-
crease the isolation of the population and arguably work against the mandates 
of Olmstead.256 For example, Nevada made changes to the statutory authority 
of its guardians in 2013.257 The statute reduces the risk that people under 
guardianship will be placed in restrictive settings for the purpose of guardian 
convenience or misinterpretation of a person’s needs.258 Furthermore, requiring 
the filing of the petition promotes the goals of Olmstead because it allows 
courts to ensure that a ward has the opportunity to live in the least restrictive 
environment for his or her condition.259 Nevada’s statute is a positive change 
that serves to protect the dignity of people under guardianship while adhering 
to the spirit of Olmstead and the ADA.260 
Nevada’s statute, however, falls short of adequately protecting the inter-
ests of wards, as it goes on to state that the petition is not required if the move 
is “pursuant to a written recommendation by a physician, social worker or Pro-
tective Services employee.”261 This provision compromises the court’s ability 
                                                                                                                           
 251 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 212. 
 252 See Casasanto et al., supra note 24, at 554 (stating in a model guardianship code that guardi-
ans may be required to seek court review for particularly significant decisions, including the decision 
to withhold food and hydration). 
 253 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 98; Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 216. Scholars fear that agen-
cies will be motivated to use their own programs and resources for their wards, rather than zealously 
advocating for what is truly in the wards’ best interests. See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 98; Teaster et al., 
supra note 3, at 216. 
 254 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 98; Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 216. 
 255 See Anderson, supra note 183 (suggesting that agencies serving seniors may benefit from 
abusive probate actions). This concern is not limited to the social service agency model, however. See 
Fields et al., supra note 166 (discussing a county public guardianship program whose funding was 
eliminated in 1990, ultimately resulting in the agency giving apparent preference to clients who had 
the assets to pay fees and those who had been referred from private hospitals who could pay fees). 
 256 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600–01. 
 257 See ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 2; S.B. 78, 77th Leg., 1st Sess. (Nev. 
2013). Nevada now specifies that a guardian must file a petition with the court before placing an individ-
ual in a residential long-term care facility. Nev. S.B. 78. 
 258 See ABA, Directions of Reform, supra note 137, at 2. 
 259 See id. 
 260 See id. 
 261 See id. 
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to have oversight over private and public guardians’ decisions to move a ward 
to a nursing home, as long as another professional agrees with the decision.262 
While many social workers, physicians and Protective Service employees are 
familiar enough with their clients to make this type of decision, that level of 
familiarity should not be assumed.263 Public guardians, if not all guardians, 
should be required to file a petition with the court whenever a more restrictive 
residential setting is sought.264 Moreover, a more protective statute would re-
quire a court to seek multiple opinions before placement in a facility—a 
placement that is rarely reversed.265 
Finally, individual judges must be educated on the importance of the pro-
tections.266 Often, even after statutes have been altered to better protect the 
interests of individuals in guardianship proceedings, individual courts and 
judges fail to implement the changes.267 This phenomenon can lead to devas-
tating results for elders who are wrongly judged to be incapacitated or who are 
assigned guardians who fail to live up to their fiduciary duties.268 Scholars 
have pointed out that unlike in a typical legal dispute, where both sides have 
the ability to advocate for their interests, the judge in a guardianship case must 
act as the protector of one of the parties.269 If judges do not enforce the re-
quirements of the statutes, elders under guardianship will continue to face a 
significant risk of abuse, neglect, and exploitation from guardians.270 
                                                                                                                           
 262 Kelly et al., supra note 200 (reporting on a social worker with seventy wards who was unable 
to meet proper guardianship standards). 
 263 See id. Social workers and Protective Service Workers have large caseloads as often as public 
guardians, and may be no more familiar with the elder than the guardian. See Fields et al., supra note 
166; Kelly et al., supra note 200. Thus, the recommendation of another professional should not be pre-
sumed sufficient to guarantee the ward’s placement in the least restrictive environment. See Fields et al., 
supra note 166; Kelly et al., supra note 200. 
 264 See Kelly et al., supra note 200. 
 265 See id. 
 266 See Winchell, supra note 39, at 697. The ABA’s handbook for judicial determinations of ca-
pacity provides detailed guidelines for judges to consider at each step of the assessment process. See 
generally ABA, HANDBOOK, supra note 212 (providing a framework for judges to utilize when mak-
ing determinations of capacity). The handbook provides the rationale behind common guardianship 
statutes and warns judges about common pitfalls. See id. at 14 (instructing judges to “[b]e sure the 
emergency guardianship does not become an automatic doorway to permanent guardianship that by-
passes procedural safeguards”); id. at 16 (advising that if initial reports from people involved in the 
case do not give a full picture of a person’s capacity, the judge should seek more information from 
informants before making a determination). 
 267 See Hardy, supra note 13, at 27 (noting incomplete reports, financial accountings that were not 
heard by the court, and inconsistent inventories, among other issues, in a review of a county guardian-
ship program); Winchell, supra note 39, at 697 (expressing concern that statutory reform may not 
effect wide change, as little evidence shows that judges have internalized the values inherent in the 
reforms); Fields et al., supra note 182 (telling stories of several elders taken significant advantage of 
by conservators and guardians after courts failed to implement proper notice and other procedures). 
 268 See Hardy, supra note 13, at 27; Fields et al., supra note 182; Kelly et al., supra note 200. 
 269 See Hardy, supra note 13, at 27; Fields et al., supra note 182; Kelly et al., supra note 200. 
 270 See Hardy, supra note 13, at 27; Fields et al., supra note 182; Kelly et al., supra note 200. 
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Moreover, in addition to being familiar with the changing statutes and 
written standards for guardians, judges must be well-informed of the purposes 
and spirit of the law.271 A judge who is familiar with the history of guardian-
ship and reasons for reform, as well as the abuses and exploitation that can 
take place without proper oversight, may be less likely to grant guardianship 
without hearing from the elder or allow guardians to miss annual reporting 
deadlines.272 Some scholars have even recommended assigning specific judges 
to the oversight and monitoring of guardians.273 These judges would be specif-
ically trained in the types of issues that affect guardianship proceedings, possi-
bly including dementia, medical diagnoses, complex case management, and 
family dynamics.274 The ward’s inability to self-advocate requires that the 
judge be mindful of all of these concerns for statutory protections to success-
fully serve the mandates of Olmstead.275 
3. State Funding for Public Guardianship Programs 
States also must provide sufficient funds for guardianship services.276 
States have started altering policies to provide adequate funding for wards to 
be supported in their homes and communities, but funding for guardianship 
services must continue.277 
Disability rights advocates have argued that state budgets should be real-
located to allow for more home and community-based support, in order to 
align with Olmstead.278 Accordingly, in recent years, many states have taken 
                                                                                                                           
 271 See Hardy, supra note 13, at 27; Winchell, supra note 39, at 697; Kelly et al., supra note 200. 
 272 See Hardy, supra note 13, at 18. See generally Kelly et al., supra note 200 (reporting that 
guardians continued to be assigned wards despite “wholesale indifference to court rules,” such as 
those requiring guardians to be held accountable for the ward’s assets and finances). 
 273 Hardy, supra note 13, at 27. Judge Hardy describes systems that utilize judicial specialization 
in Washoe County and Clark County, Nevada. Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 See Hardy, supra note 13, at 18; Winchell, supra note 39, at 697; Kelly et al., supra note 200. 
 276 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 238 (stating that states should provide a minimum cost per 
ward). 
 277 See Johnson & Bowers, supra note 126, at 454 (predicting that Olmstead could be “ushering 
in a quiet revolution in long-term care” that could “transform the social response to people with physi-
cal or mental disabilities”); Karp et al., supra note 6, at 1455 (stating that since Olmstead, the federal 
government has taken steps to strengthen home- and community-based options for older and disabled 
people); Kathryn E. McDonough & Joan K. Davitt, It Takes A Village: Community Practice, Social 
Work, and Aging-in-Place, 54 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 528, 529 (2011) (stating that the 
Olmstead case and the aging population have increased pressure on government to make changes); see 
also ROBERT B. HUDSON, The Older Americans Act and the Aging Services Network, in THE NEW 
POLITICS OF OLD AGE POLICY 307, 315 (Robert B. Hudson ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
 278 See Batavia, supra note 60, at 39; see also Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 
1217, 1222 (D.N.M. 2000) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim against a governor for acts that led 
them to be denied waiver services). Some scholars have even suggested that costs should be irrelevant 
once a court determines that a person’s rights have been violated. See Batavia, supra note 60, at 32. But 
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steps to rebalance Medicaid funds.279 For example, programs such as Money 
Follows the Person (“MFP”) follow the Olmstead mandate because they real-
locate funds that are spent on nursing homes to instead allow older individuals 
to transition back to a community.280 Thus, a rebalancing of Medicaid funds 
promotes the independence and dignity of this population.281 
Expanding funding could also address a central issue in public guardian-
ship policy: the ratio of staff to wards within guardianship programs.282 In the 
2005 national study of public guardianship, researchers found that the majority 
of public guardianship programs were severely understaffed, leading to a high 
amount of wards per guardian.283 This situation arguably violates Olmstead 
because of the guardian’s inability to give sufficient attention to each case.284 
High numbers of wards can make it impossible for a guardian to thoroughly 
assess the appropriate level of housing for each ward.285 Furthermore, though 
insufficient data exist to determine whether this has occurred, a large number 
of wards creates a perverse incentive to relocate wards to a place where many 
can be visited in one trip—such as an assisted living or nursing facility.286 
                                                                                                                           
see Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 615 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that the state Medicaid 
program was not required to cover an independent living service called “safety monitoring”). 
 279 PYNOOS ET AL., supra note 93, at 330. 
 280 See id. Consumers are then able to use the funds to purchase adaptive equipment for their 
homes and choose caregivers with whom they are comfortable. See id. Although providing home and 
community services is consistent with Olmstead and could improve the well-being of millions, it 
should also be noted that, like institutional care, it is costly for state budgets. See SCHULZ & BIN-
STOCK, supra note 3, at 173. Individuals who pay out of pocket for their services save on in-home 
care only when that care is provided primarily by family members. Id. Round-the-clock care by pro-
fessionals can be just as costly as a nursing home. Id. The costs are expected to grow as fewer younger 
Americans choose to provide long-term care for relatives in their own homes. Id. at 179. 
 281 PYNOOS ET AL., supra note 93, at 330. 
 282 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 248–49; Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 238; Leonard et al., 
supra note 182; Fields et al., supra note 166. 
 283 See Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 219, 232 (reporting that virtually all states reported a lack of 
funding and staffing; the average ratio of staff to wards was one to thirty-six, with some as high as one 
to fifty, one to eighty, and one to 173); see also Fields et al., supra note 166. The authors argue that 
the public guardian’s inability to adequately serve Los Angeles citizens led to an increase in for-profit 
conservators, some of whom preyed on wealthy seniors who did not have family advocates. See Fields 
et al., supra note 166. 
 284 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 248–49; Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 238; Fields et al., supra 
note 166 (noting that the county’s public guardianship office was so “swamped” that they were some-
times unable to provide for clients’ basic needs, including glasses, hearing aids and dentures); Leonard 
et al., supra note 182. Lack of funding can also affect the number of cases that are taken on by a pub-
lic guardianship program. See Fields et al., supra note 166. The authors described how the lack of 
funding from the county caused the public guardianship program to turn away four out of five people 
who were referred for assistance. Id. This had disastrous results for some of the clients, including one 
who died in a nursing home after not receiving services. Id. 
 285 Fields et al., supra note 166; Kelly et al., supra note 200; Larrubia et al., supra note 238. 
 286 Fields et al., supra note 166; Larrubia et al., supra note 238. 
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Thus, states that do not provide enough funding for a reasonable ratio of staff 
to wards may be in violation of Olmstead.287 
One of the main reasons for the ADA’s enactment was to curb the mis-
treatment and isolation of people with disabilities.288 Providing funding for 
more stringent protections for elders would send an important message that 
society values the independence, dignity, and value of older adults.289 
CONCLUSION 
The demographics of the elder population are changing, and with the 
change comes a need for a public guardianship system better suited for people 
who will live longer lives with incapacitating conditions. Historically, guardi-
anship across the United States remained unregulated, resulting in a loss of 
protections for many Americans with disabilities. The rights and autonomy of 
older Americans were undervalued, and procedures for determining mental 
capacity lacked proper guidelines. States have made great strides over the past 
several decades toward protecting the rights of individuals under their care, but 
the lack of protections in public guardianship systems persist. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1999 interpretation of the ADA in Olmstead v. 
L.C. ex rel. Zimring provides an important mandate for states to correct the 
lack of protections. In particular, the social service agency model—the most 
popular public guardianship model among states—may be inherently problem-
atic due to the risk of conflicts of interest for the agency. Proper statutory 
guidelines and protections, however, could help to protect wards, particular 
those who are under the public guardianship of a social service agency. Appro-
priate standards for accountability, oversight, and funding for public guardians 
would help bring states into compliance with the mandates of the ADA and 
Olmstead. 
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 287 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587; Teaster et al., supra note 3, at 238. Furthermore, a staff-to-
ward ratio could help to save money in the long run. See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 136. A thirty-
month study performed by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy found an average decrease 
in residential costs per client with a 1:20 staff-to-ward ratio, due to moves to less restrictive environ-
ments. Id.; MASON BURLEY, PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP IN WASHINGTON STATE: COSTS AND BENEFITS 
16 (2011). The study also reported savings from decreased personal care hours for clients with public 
guardians. See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 136; BURLEY, supra at 16. 
 288 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012). 
 289 See id.; see also Hardy, supra note 13, at 2 (stating that “[w]e may be judged by the way we 
treat our weaker and more vulnerable citizens” and arguing that the protection of elderly citizens is as 
important as that of children). 
 
 
 
 
